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Abstract 
 
Luigi Pareyson‘s concept of formativity is one of his most relevant and 
original concepts. In this paper I will give a short exposition of this concept in 
Pareyson‘s Estetica and try to show how it can account, better as other object, 
subject-, target- oriented theories, even of some features of contemporary art. 
The very relevant innovation that we can find in this concept is the shift from 
a concept of art as poiesis—as it is in Aristotle, namely, as a production of an 
object—to the concept of art as praxis, that is, as an activity which involves 
the entire doing of the artist. As a doing that invents the form of doing, 
formativity appears as a kind of schematism that operates, not only without 
concept, as it is in Kant‘s Critique of Judgement, but even without object. The 
thesis here suggested is that formativity can be understood as a 
transcendentalism of invention. 
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I 
The goal of this article is to discuss the concept of 
‗formativity‘ formulated by the Italian philosopher Luigi 
Pareyson, the teacher of more well-known philosophers as 
Gianni Vattimo and Umberto Eco at the University of Turin.1 
This concept is presented by Pareyson in his book Estetica, 
published in its first edition in 1954, with the subtitle Teoria 
della formatività (Theory of formativity). The word ‗formativity‘, 
a neologism that Pareyson himself defined as ―inelegant‖, 
expresses one of his most innovative ideas. As it is clear from 
the very beginning of the Preface, Pareyson avoids ‗form‘, which 
would mean the conclusive and definitely static moment of a 
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process, and instead chooses ‗formativity‘ in order to denote the 
generative process, the dynamical and processual moment of 
forming. The ‗aesthetics of formativity‘ concerns then the 
creative, poietical process of art. 
―To form means to make – poiein‖, so Pareyson writes 
(1974, p. 59). It is a definition that at first seems to be 
consonant with a long standing tradition, since it associates 
formativity, as the peculiar nature of art, with poiesis, that is, 
to production. However, the concept itself of formativity and the 
central position it assumes in Pareyson‘s aesthetic theory make 
this definition, not so much problematic, but at least reductive, 
risking the concealment of the truly innovative import of such a 
theory. If forming, as the particular character of art, were only 
poiesis, i.e. the production of objects, the capacity of the theory 
of formativity to explain some phenomena of contemporary art 
would be significantly downsized. I would like to show, instead, 
that merely by assuming formativity as the essential nature of 
art, Pareyson can account (even if not intentionally) for some of 
the peculiarities of contemporary art, but only at the price of 
challenging (which is not a loss) the coincidence of formativity 
and poiesis. 
 
II 
The definition of art as poiesis dates back to Aristotle. In 
fact, in the sixth Book of the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle 
includes techne among those dianoetic virtues that concern not 
knowledge, but making: more precisely, it regards the 
production of objects, or poiesis. Art is a part of that field of 
human acting which deals with the production of objects that 
are not generated in nature, and that differs from another kind 
of doing, namely,  praxis. ―While making (poiesis) has an end 
other than itself, action (praxis) cannot; for good action itself is 
its end.‖  (Aristotle 2009: 1140b) 
By referring to their end, Aristotle then established a 
clear distinction between productive, heterotelic  doing, whose 
end is external to the action itself, and non-productive, autotelic 
doing, whose end is the fulfilment of the good. He in fact writes 
that ―neither is acting making nor is making acting‖. (ibid., 
1140a) Poiesis and praxis therefore cover two fields that do not 
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overlap, and that are not included one into the other (ibid.), just 
their corresponding virtues do not overlap: techne, on one hand, 
and phronesis, on the other. 
Another difference between poiesis and praxis concerns 
the very nature of these virtues. In fact, techne, which 
corresponds to poiesis, makes use of a knowing that relates to 
the nature of the object, while phronesis, the virtue of praxis, 
cannot rely on such a thing: the fact that it does not produce an 
object removes the possibility of ruling its acting on the basis of 
some eternal or contingent nature. Therefore, it is neither 
science nor art (ibid., 1140b), but an experiential knowing, 
which has evermore to cope with unscripted situations, and 
thus is intrinsically innovative. 
Beside these differences, there is something common to 
poiesis and praxis: deliberation (bouleusis). It is in fact 
necessary in all those acts that depend on human being, 
whether they are productive or non-productive, and concern not 
the end, but the means, i.e. what leads to the end: ―We 
deliberate not about ends but about what contributes to ends. 
[…] The subject of investigation is sometimes the instruments, 
sometimes the use of them; and similarly in the other cases – 
sometimes the means (di’oû), sometimes the mode (pôs) or the 
means of bringing it about (dià tínos).‖ (Aristotle 2009, 1112b) 
What poiesis and praxis, the productive and non-productive 
doing, have in common is then the deliberation on the means, 
or more generically, on the way of achieving or carrying out the 
action. To this aim, art can rely, as we said, on the materiality 
and specificity of the object to be produced, which orients the 
choice of the more suitable technique for its fulfilment, whereas 
praxis is uniquely oriented by the good, and by its inevitable  
contingency, since it depends on the kairos, on the opportune 
moment. The absence of the object in praxis makes the value of 
the deliberation consist completely in the way of doing, in the 
eu of the eupraxia. 
 
III 
We can then say that the choice of the way of doing, the 
deliberation, represents the common trait to both, poiesis and 
praxis, although with different presuppositions and conditions.  
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Pareyson‘s aesthetics—because it takes formativity, that is, the 
invention of the way of doing, as its basic concept, —posits itself 
exactly in this field common to poiesis and praxis. Moreover, by 
assuming formativity as the essential nature of art, it extends 
the concept of art beyond the restricted field to which Aristotle 
limited it, that of the production of objects, and turns it, I would 
say, into a transcendental dimension of every human 
operativity, that is, of human acting in general-- thereby 
ridding itself of the fact that it aims at the production of objects.  
One can then say that formativity is not properly poiesis but 
praxis. This is the idea I would like to support here, which 
questions the clear separation that Aristotle traced between 
them. In essence, with his theory of formativity, Pareyson 
undertakes a double operation: he finds in the invention of the 
way of doing the specific trait of art, but, at the same time, 
assumes it as the specific character of every human acting, even 
if it is non-productive. The following quotation states this very 
clearly: 
Every human operation is always formative, and even a work of 
thought and a practical work require the exercise of formativity. A 
virtuous action [also praxis, G.C.] must be invented as that which is 
required by the moral law in that specific circumstance, and must be 
performed and achieved with a movement that at the same time 
invents the better way of carrying it out; in posing and resolving a 
problem, in deducing consequences from a principle, in conducting a 
demonstration, in connecting arguments in a systematic whole, the 
implementation of movements of thought is always needed, and so 
the discovery, through an act of invention, of what reason requires in 
that specific case, as well as the explicit formulation of thoughts. 
Productive force and inventive capability are then required by 
thought and by action, since the speculative and practical operations 
are made by a formative activity that in that specific field performs 
and produces the works at the same time it invents the way of doing 
them. (Pareyson 1974, p. 23)  
In this long passage it is clear that for Pareyson 
formativity is not the exclusive territory of art in a strict sense 
(that is, as poiesis), but covers all human operations, and thus 
also praxis and even thought, or theory. This entire field 
requires formativity, the invention of a way of doing, at the 
same time that it is the production of an object.  
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In order to better understand this point, we could refer 
here, I suggest, to the Kantian schematism. The schematism is 
for Kant ―a hidden art in the depths of the human soul, whose 
true operations we can divine from nature and lay unveiled 
before our eyes only with difficulty.‖ (Kant 2000, p. 273 - B 180-
181) In the Critique of Pure Reason the schematism mediates 
between concepts (i.e. forms of a necessary synthesis) and 
sensibility, and consists in the production, not of objects, but of 
methods, of operative monograms, in order to give images or 
objects in experience to concepts. In the Critique of Judgement, 
instead, the schematism of art consists in schematizing without 
concept, and is therefore free, because unbundled of the 
necessary synthesis of the understanding. Like this kind of 
schematism, formativity is certainly free; indeed, it schematizes 
without concept, without a category of the understanding. 
However, its peculiarity is that it can schematize even without 
object. It is actually a schematism that concerns principally, 
and even uniquely, the way of doing as such. That‘s why it is 
not poiesis but praxis. What in the Aristotelian classification 
was a trait, not of a poiesis but of a praxis, namely, the autotelic 
nature and the central position of the way of doing, becomes for 
Pareyson the essence of formativity as distinctive of every 
human action. Every human action is art, and as formative – 
autotelic – is praxis. In this way a conceptual shift is achieved 
where art and praxis, aesthetics and ethics, indeed, aesthetics, 
ethics and theory find a significant point of conjunction. It is a 
shift whose first movement can be found again in Kant, in the 
Critique of Judgment, where this point of conjonction appears 
as a bridge connecting the territories of pure reason and of 
practical reason. Judgment is a function of the imagination, 
that is, of the capacity of forming, of creating forms. Here for 
Kant – and evidently also for Hegel and for Pareyson – the 
space of freedom opens: works of art, as well as every human 
operativity, are traces of this freedom in the world. Freedom  
appears, gives itself a sensible existence in the work of art – 
which is the invention of a way of doing – and art is nothing 
other than freedom which manifests itself in the world. Among 
all the definitions of art that have been created and can ever be 
done, this one remains, in my opinion, far and away the best.  
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Nevertheless, freedom, which appears in art, does not 
consist so much in the creation of new objects, but rather in the 
invention of new ways of doing, of acting, of representing, of 
thinking. Every human acting is art inasmuch it shows this 
freedom, which distinguishes its doing and producing from the 
natural, more precisely automatic, production. A technique as a 
mere implementation, exempt of deviations, of a pre-fixed and 
pre-established plan, is not actually human; it is the activity of 
a machine, which therefore is not free. The possibility of 
inventing the way of doing is then what makes formativity the 
peculiar trait, the very essence, of human existence. No 
properly human acting is possible without being formative, that 
is, without being free, and then art. 
 
IV 
Now let‘s test Pareyson‘s theory, which unfortunately is 
little known by the international public, in relation to 
contemporary art. It indeed has resources that can better 
interpret the peculiarity of contemporary art than other 
aesthetic theories -  object, subject or target oriented - do. The 
limit of all these aesthetic theories is that they only work so 
long as one already knows how to identify an object of art, since 
all, at the very end, are focused on the object. Alternative 
theories, such as Arthur Danto‘s relational theory or George 
Dickie‘s institutional theory, as far as they can have several 
points of contact with the Pareysonian theory (in particular the 
former one), nonetheless have the flaw of assuming a factual 
field – the world or a group of critics, scholars, historians, 
institutions – as a basis for the decision about what is art. They 
therefore risk developing into a sort of ‗artistic positivism,‘ 
which is actually the greatest enemy of every artistic creation. 
According to these theories, a work of art is such when it is 
accepted and included in a world or in an institutional system. 
Pareyson‘s concept of formativity, instead, avoids the flaws of 
these theories, whose limit is represented by the very ‗litmus 
test‘ of every theory of art: the ready-made. Duchamp‘s 
Fountain or Bottle Rack indeed challenge every objectual 
conception of art, as well as every expressive or functional 
conception, and have with every institutional theory an 
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evidently ironical relation: in the moment they are accepted in 
the world or in the field of art, they are de facto ‗sterilized‘—
they lose their critical, unconventional, innovative import, that 
is, their opposition to every institutionalization and 
positivization of art. On the contrary, from the point of view of 
Pareyson‘s theory of formativity, ready-made works show that 
the very essence of the work of art consists in the ‗way‘ it has 
been done and not in its objectual properties. As we read in the 
previous quotation, even a conceptual operation is for Pareyson 
formative, and thus art. The simple idea – and I say just the 
idea – of signing a urinal and displaying it in a museum, and 
not the mere fact of displaying it, is what makes it art, as 
invention, never before made, and the expression of an act of 
freedom. What is decisive is the formative process that led to 
this outcome, its invention, the idea behind it, which has to be 
grasped, has to be understood.  Conceptual art challenges every 
theory of art, every aesthetics, inasmuch as every aesthetics 
concentrates on the sensible qualities of an object, to which we 
traditionally refer when define it as a work of art. Formativity, 
on the contrary, makes clear that a work of art, in order to be 
grasped just as art, has to be, not perceived, but interpreted. 
In the case of the ready-made, the theory of formativity 
provides then us a criterion for evaluating the artistic nature of 
the work: it consists in the invention of a new, unprecedented 
way of fulfilling, and at most even of considering the object, be 
it a urinal, a bottle rack or a Brillo Box. This new way can 
consist in something minimal, and negative: that is, in not 
considering the object as it appears, that is, as an object of 
senses, or as it is understood by common opinion. Consequently, 
and this is the point I would like to stress, by suspending its 
everyday reality,  this minimal negativity makes the work of 
art in principle irreconcilable with every institutional, that is, 
every positive theory of art. The invention of a new way of doing 
confers to the work of art a differential trait, which constitutes 
the unity of originality and continuity, which is, as Pareyson 
writes, the very temporality of a work of art. But just for this 
reason every work of art brings with itself, in the form of a 
difference, a negativity that no positivization or 
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institutionalization of art will never be able to efface and shall 
never efface 
 
V 
These considerations might encounter an objection. We 
can indeed say that with his definition of formativity Pareyson 
succeeds in explaining the artistic nature, even purely 
conceptual, of Duchamp‘s works only because, eventually, 
formativity covers all of human doing, and thus lacks that 
specificity that should distinguish art from other human 
activities. Every human operation is artistic,  
so that we can say that the whole of spiritual life is, in some way, 
‗art‘: in every field of human operativity nothing can be done without 
inventing in some way the way of doing. Whatever we do, we need 
‗art,‘ and no thing can be done without ‗art‘: there is no human 
business, albeit humble, tenuous and insignificant, that does not 
require, in him who attends to it, ‗art‘, that is, the  capacity of 
inventing the way of doing by doing [inventare il modo di fare 
facendo], and of doing by knowing how to do, and nothing can be 
reached if doing does not become inventive as well as productive, 
attempting and figuring as well as performing and achieving 
[inventivo oltre che produttivo, tentativo e figurante oltre che 
esecutivo e realizzatore]. (Kant 2000, p. 273 - B 180-181) 
If every operation is formativity, then everything—from 
the Gioconda to the ready-made to the chairs in this room—is 
art. However, this generalness, or better, this generality of 
formativity, which covers any human activity, even the more 
humble and utilitarian ones, does not trim away and efface the 
specificity of art. Indeed, art is that sphere of human acting 
where formativity emerges as such, where it becomes dominant, 
since it is the aim itself of acting. It is a ‗forming for forming‘, 
just as in the case of the ready-mades: they can be very trivial, 
everyday, already made objects, so that the operation that 
elevates them to art really produces nothing, and confers to 
them no utility (indeed, it consists in the suspension of their 
utility). The artistic operation that makes art a certain 
production of human activity concentrates in the way of doing, 
in the form, and then at least in the way of considering them. 
The specificity of art consists for Pareyson in being pure 
formativity: 
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The artistic operation is a process of invention and production 
performed not in order to fulfill works that are speculative, practical, 
or whatever they can be, but only for itself: forming for forming, 
forming by pursuing uniquely the form for itself: art is pure 
formativity. (ibid., 64) 
Works of art are thus not forms insofar as they are 
works, that is, because they are material objects, but are works 
insofar as they are forms, because, namely, they are formed 
objects: 
formativity succeeds in being pure [and thus art], that is in forming 
forms, which are nothing other than forms, and which require to be 
considered only as forms, only if it is formation of a physical matter, 
given that only physical matter, once it is formed, is form and only 
form. (ibid., 42)2     
What makes art a work of art is not then its materiality 
but the fact of having a form. The ready-made shows then the 
purely transcendental nature of artistic invention, which 
invents a ‗condition,‘ in the double meaning of the term: a 
possibility that produces a new status, an operation that is then 
formative and transformative at a transcendental level, a level 
of a higher-order praxis, which is not that positive of the 
empirical object. Formativity, as a general trait of every human 
doing, therefore finds its purity in art, which the ready-made 
expresses to the highest degree. 
 
VI 
The theory of formativity differs, as I believe I have 
shown, from all the aesthetics that today occupy the scene of 
philosophical debate. Pareyson‘s is not, actually, an object-
oriented aesthetics, since it does not focus on the object, on its 
qualities, on its properties, does not assume, above all, the 
object as the determining factor for deciding what is art. 
Neither is it a source-oriented aesthetics, similar to that of 
Collingwood or Croce, which when Pareyson published his 
Estetica dominated the Italian philosophical scene: an 
aesthetics that sees in the work of art the expression of feeling 
or subjective contents of the artist. It is not even a target-
oriented aesthetics, since it is completely alien to a functional 
consideration of the artwork, that is, to a consideration of the 
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effect that it provokes or should provoke in the user or the 
spectator. It is not a relational or institutional theory of art, 
because these theories result in a positivization of the world of 
art and of what is art. Unlike these aesthetics – that take into 
account firstly the object, the subject or the goal of the artistic 
creation, or lose the negative nature of art – Pareyson‘s 
aesthetics is focused on formativity, the character of every 
human activity, ―for which it is, at once, production and 
invention,‖ a doing that, by doing, ―invents the way of doing.‖ 
(Pareyson 1974, p. 18). Therefore, it cannot but challenge what 
is already constituted and established. The very object of 
Pareyson‘s aesthetics is here: neither the work, nor the subject, 
nor the end, but the way of doing. 
I believe that we could call this aesthetics 
‗transcendental‘– which in this sense is, as I said, Kantian – 
since with the word ‗transcendental‘ we mean a knowing that 
concerns not the object but the way of relating to the object. It 
is, however, a transcendentalism in which the form, the way of 
this relation, is itself invented, is even the real object of the 
creative act: the aesthetics of formativity is what we could call a 
‗transcendentalism of invention,‘ meaning what is primarily 
invented through the creative act is the way of doing. The form, 
which Pareyson points out with the word ‗formativity,‘ is the 
form of doing. What the artist invents is first of all a technique, 
or more precisely, a style. 
There are works that do not express anything and do not say 
anything, but their style is very eloquent, because it is the 
spirituality itself of the author. One will say that, just in this sense, 
art is expressive, and the feeling is present inasmuch it results 
completely in the form; but we do not see then why it would be 
necessary to claim that only through feeling the spiritual life could 
penetrate in the art, and that only through a lyrical condensation it 
could turn into an image; because the spiritual life, in the infinite 
richness of its aspects, makes itself, as a whole, style and way of 
forming; in the same way, even the more stylized arabesque, the 
coldest architecture and the more elaborated counterpoint, which do 
not express for themselves any feeling, and do not have any lyrical 
character, contain a whole civilization made style, a whole way of 
interpreting the world and of acting in front of life, a whole way of 
thinking living and feeling, a whole collective and personal 
spirituality in the infinite richness of its aspects.(ibid., 38-39) 
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  By assuming formativity as the distinctive trait of 
every human operation, and then of praxis, which finds in art 
its highest purity, Pareyson tried to say, in conclusion,  that all 
of human life, from the more elevated to the more humble, does 
not express, at least not primarily, a content, a feeling or a 
specific meaning, but a way of being, a ‗style‘: he tried to tell us 
that every human operation, and perhaps more deeply the 
human life as such, is ultimately a work of art. 
 
 
NOTES 
 
 
1 The bibliography of Luigi Pareyson accessible to the English readers is till 
now not so wide. I can point out Pareyson 2009 and 2013. For a general 
presentation of his philosophy, see Chiurazzi 2015. 
2 The observation in square brackets is mine). The same idea is expressed in 
an essay in which Pareyson sums up in few pages and in a very 
comprehensive way his aesthetic theory. See Pareyson (1965, p. 103).  
 
 
REFERENCES 
 
Aristotle. 2009. Nicomachean Ethics. Tr. by D. Ross, rev. by L. 
Brown. Oxford; Oxford University Press. 
Chiurazzi, Gaetano. 2015. ―Pareyson and Vattimo: from Truth 
to Nihilism‖. In: Companion to Hermeneutics, ed. by J. Malpas 
and Hans-Helmut Gander. New York: Routledge. 
Kant, Immanuel. 2000. Critique of the Pure Reason. Tr. P. 
Guyer and A.W. Wood. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Pareyson, Luigi. 1965. ―La mia prospettiva estetica‖. In: Teoria 
dell’arte. Saggi di estetica. Milano: Marzorati. 
Pareyson, Luigi. 1974. Estetica: Teoria della formatività. 
Firenze: Sansoni. 
Pareyson, Luigi. 2009. Existence, Interpretation, Freedo. 
Selected Writings. Ed. by P.D. Bubbio, tr. by A. Mattei. Aurora, 
CO: The Davies Group Publishers. 
Pareyson, Luigi. 2013. Truth and Interpretation. Tr. by R. 
Valgenti. Albany, NY: SUNY Press. 
 
 Gaetano Chiurazzi / On Formativity: Art as Praxis 
 
 
421 
 
 
Valgenti, Robert. 2005. ―The Primacy of Interpretation in Luigi 
Pareyson‘s Hermeneutics of Common Sense‖. Philosophy Today 
49 (4): 333-41. 
 
 
Gaetano Chiurazzi is Professor of Theoretical Philosophy at the University 
of Torino, Italy. He studied and worked as research fellow in the Universities 
of Torino, Berlin, Heidelberg, Paris and Oxford. His interests are especially 
concerned with French and German philosophy (Derrida, Kant, Hegel, 
Husserl, Heidegger, and Gadamer), as well as with ancient philosophy (Plato, 
Aristotle). This is attested by his main publications: Scrittura e Gaetano 
Chiurazzi / Possibility and Radical Understanding 715 tecnica. Derrida e la 
metafisica (1992); Hegel, Heidegger e la grammatica dell‘essere (1996); Teorie 
del giudizio (2005); Modalità ed esistenza (2001); L‘esperienza della verità 
(2011). With Gianni Vattimo he is the co-editor of Tropos. Rivista di 
ermeneutica e critica filosofica.  
 
 
 
Address: 
Gaetano Chiurazzi  
Associate professor  
Dipartimento di Filosofia e Scienze dell‘Educazione  
Via S. Ottavio, 20 – 10124 Torino (Italy)  
Email: gaetano.chiurazzi@unito.it  
